Crisis Management Case Study

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ToBe Analysis

S-Cube framework

The structure of the S-Cube use case description framework is based on three main parts:

  1. Business Goals (BG) and Domain Assumptions (DA): they describe objectives to be pursued (BG) and properties assumed to be true (DA). Each BG or DA is described through a specific table.
  2. Domain description: it describes the laws and specificities of the sub-part of the world in which the use case occurs. Usually, this domain description is based on several elements:
    1. A glossary: listing and describing the concepts of the domain.
    2. Domain model(s): describing the relations between concepts of the domain (the ones from the glossary).
    3. Laws: describing specific characteristics of the concepts of the domain (the ones from the glossary).
    4. Strategic dependency diagram and context diagram: describing dependencies and relations between actors of the domain.
  3. Scenario description: it is an operational description of the steps of the use case. It is described through tables (one per sub-scenario) containing actors concerned and textual description of the scenario. Furthermore, the sub-scenario might be also described with a model or a diagram.

Furthermore, we believe that an ontology could be built in order to ensure a large part of the domain description as described in section Such an ontology could provide a list and a description of the concepts of the domain (glossary), the relations between these concepts (domain model) and the specific characteristics of these concepts (laws). Concerning the dependencies and relations between actors, a UML use case diagram will be used as described in section

Finally, concerning the scenario description, the expected tables will be provided, completed with BPMN diagram to describe processes, as presented in section 2.3.6.

Source of the problem

The radiation leak in this scenario originates from the combination of two problems:

  • The metal of the steam generator is very thin. Due to the wearing effect of time, a leak appeared in the steam generator. As a result, the water within the primary loop, contaminated, spreads through the secondary loop.

Consequences: The steam of the secondary loop is contaminated and the pressure within the secondary loop increases.

  • The throttle valve, a safety device of the secondary loop, opens due to the increased pressure inside the secondary loop. It does not respond to the manual bypass of the safety loop, requiring its closure.

Consequences: The steam of the secondary loop, contaminated, escapes from the secondary loop to the atmosphere.

These problems are illustrated by Figure 7.

First problem: leak within the steam generator => contact between primary and secondary loopsThrottle valveSecond problem: throttle valve blocked open

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig07 NuclearPlant.jpg
Image source :
Figure 7: Schema of the nuclear plant

Crisis cell and actors

To resolve the crisis, many stakeholders are involved. The crisis cell, in charge of operation, is piloted by the prefect (representative of the national authority), outside the nuclear plant. Delegates of each actor are present in the crisis cell. Firemen, policemen, and any other actor involved in the response process has one representative in the crisis cell, to validate the feasibility of decisions, link with the field and ensure communication between actors. This crisis cell is distributed. Most of the decisions are made locally, where prefects and delegates are gathered, but decisions may also come from the national authority, local or national responsible of the nuclear plant or experts. (Cf. Figure 8). 
PLAY CrisisManagement Fig08 CrisisCell.jpg
Figure 8: Distributed crisis cell and actors

Sequencing of activities

To simulate the response to a nuclear accident, a list of actions to be performed has been created. This table will serve as a basis for the first version of the scenario. Additional elements of complexity of the situation that better show the value added of PLAY system will be developed (see part 2.4 Workplan).

Legend of the table:

Choreography (flow between 2 or more business processes)
Continuous or repetitive task
Timing Actor Crisis cell Sensor Event type Event nature Action Processes
12h         Leak within the steam generator => contact between primary and secondary loops    
12h10 Nuclear Plant Teams (NP1)   pressure in the primary loop Situation Detection of the leak to stop reactor (yet flows within primary and secondary loops continue)  
12h11     throttle valve open /close sensor Situation Throttle valve opens    
12h11 Nuclear Plant Teams (NP1)         to require the closure of the throttle valve  
        Situation throttle valve does not respond to closing order    
12h11       Consequence Risk of radioactive leakage in the atmosphere    
12h11 Nuclear Plant Teams (NP1)         to alert responsible of nuclear plant  
12h11 Nuclear Plant Teams (NP1)         to send a technician to check valve status and manually close the valve if necessary  
12h11 Local responsible of the nuclear plant         to activate PUI  
  Radiation Survey Network (NP2)     Situation Confirmation of the leak to confirm leak by measurements  
  Local responsible of the nuclear plant         to call the representative of local authority (prefect)  
  Representative of the local authority         to activate PPI in reflex mode To manage
  Local responsible of the nuclear plant         to alert populations (siren) To respond
12h18 Nuclear Plant Teams (NP1)     Situation Throttle valve confirmed open by technician    
  Local responsible of the nuclear plant EDF local cell       to activate EDF local crisis management cell To manage
  Local responsible of the nuclear plant         to call the representative of EDF national  
  National responsible of the nuclear plant EDF national cell       to activate EDF national cell To manage
  Representative of the local authority         to call the representative of national authority  
  Representative of the national authority National authority cell       to activate national authority cell To manage
13h Local responsible of the nuclear plant         to contact media to inform that the PUI is activated To manage
  Representative of the local authority         to alert field actors (firemen, police, army, office of infrastructure, radiation survey network, meteo france, Mobile emergency medical services, mayors) To manage
12h20   Local authority cell       to define safety perimeter To manage
12h25 Police (P)     Activity   to position safety perimeter To respond
    EDF local cell       to keep representatives of local and national authority informed To manage
12h30 Nuclear Plant Teams (NP1)     Situation throttle valve blocked open, manual closure failed    
every min Radiation Survey Network (NP2)     Situation   to measure radioactivity level and post information To support
every min Meteo France (MF)     Situation   to measure wind force and direction and precipitations + to post information To support
12h40         throttle valve finally closed    
  Local responsible of the nuclear plant         to inform other cells that leak is stopped  
  Representative of the local authority Local authority cell       to receive, synthesize and centralise information of each member of the cell To manage
  Representative of the local authority         to provide instructions to cell members and spread information received from national authorities To manage
  All field actors         to inform local authorities about operations updates and difficulties. To respond
    Local authority cell       to define circulation plan To manage
  Police (P)     Activity   to implement circulation plan To respond
  Police (P)     Activity   to block access within the safety perimeter (10km around plant) To respond
  Radiation Survey Network (NP2)   radioactivity   radioactivity level measured at 10 mSv   To support
  Representative of the local authority         to contact scientific cell to info about high radioactivity measure To manage
    Scientific cell       to advise local authority cell to tell population to ingest iodine pill and wait for a risk to achieve 50mSv to send evacuation order To manage
14h Representative of the local authority         to decide that populations should ingest iodine pills To manage
14h10 Media         to inform populations that they should ingest iodine pills To respond
  Mobil Emergency Medical Services (MEMS)     Activity   to distribute iodine pills to impacted population (for those, who did not already have pills) To respond
  Impacted Population         to ingest iodine pills To respond
  Radiation Survey Network (NP2)   radioactivity   radioactivity level measured at 20 mSv, increasing => risk to achieve 50mSv soon   To support
  Meteo France (MF)   wind, rain   wind : 5m/s, direction south westrain : 2mm/h   To support
    Scientific cell       to advice about evacuation perimeter and direction  
14h30 Representative of the local authority         to decide to evacuate populations To manage
    Local authority cell       to define evacuation perimeter To manage
  Mobil Emergency Medical Services (MEMS)     Activity   to assist victims and support psychologically To respond
  Media         to inform population that they have to evacuate To respond
  Impacted Population         to make sure their accommodation is safe (switch off heating devices, etc.) To respond
  Impacted Population         to evacuate by light vehicle or to go to the meeting point for bus evacuation To respond
  Representative of the local authority     Resource   to requisition buses To support
15h Private Companies     Activity   to send buses to meeting point To respond
15h20 Police (P)       Road works on the main road created a traffic jam to inform local authority cell that there is a traffic jam on the main road To respond
    Local authority cell       to modify circulation plan To manage
15h55         Accident on the secondary road to inform local authority cell that there is an accident To respond
16h   Local authority cell       to send firemen to assist victims To support
16h10   Local authority cell       to re-modify circulation plan To manage
16h15 Police (P)     Activity   to implement third circulation plan To respond
16h30 Firemen (F)     Activity   to assist and evacuate victims To respond
Table 1: Sequencing of activities during the first hours of the crisis

Business goals and Domain Assumptions

Extracted from the edSIPOC model (As-Is description of the use case), the following Business Goals and Domain Assumptions have been selected for the To-Be model:

Table BG1. Business Goal NuclearUC-BG-01
Short Name
To plan and control relief process and means
Business Goals.
To execute Global Emergency Plan (PPI)

To mobilize protection and relief resources

To communicate with media and local authorities

To animate crisis management cell

Decisions have to be made to solve as fast as possible the nuclear accident in one hand, and to limit consequences of this accident on the other hand
Involved Stakeholders
Representative of the national authority

Representative of the military authority

Scientific cell

Meteo France



Mobile emergency medical service

French army

Office of infrastructure


Mobile measurement station

Priority of accomplishment
Must have.
Table BG2. Business Goal NuclearUC-BG-02
Short Name
To protect population
Business Goals.
To alert / communicate

To confine

To distribute (iodine capsules)

To evacuate

To forbid

To keep the number of victims as low as possible
Involved Stakeholders
Radio France



Mobile Emergency medical services

French Army


Priority of accomplishment
Must have.
Table BG3. Business Goal NuclearUC-BG-03
Short Name
To provide aid for employees and populations
Business Goals.
To decontaminate

To extinguish fire / explosion

To rescue people after an accident

To support psychologically

To find new accommodation

To limit the consequences of the crisis
Involved Stakeholders


Mobile emergency medical service

French Army

Priority of accomplishment
Must have.
Table BG4. Business Goal NuclearUC-BG-04
Short Name
To back repairing and relief operations
Business Goals.
To secure perimeter

To make available resources / means

To support all crisis response operations
Involved Stakeholders
Nuclear plant teams

Representative of the national authority

Radio France


Mobile emergency medical service



Office of infrastructures

Priority of accomplishment
Must have.
Table BG5. Business Goal NuclearUC-BG-05
Short Name
To assess situation
Business Goals.
To measure radioactivity

To measure weather characteristics (wind velocity/direction, rain, etc.)

To assess the situation continuously
Involved Stakeholders
Nuclear Plant teams

Meteo France

Radiation survey network


Measuring equipment

Mobile measurement station

Priority of accomplishment
Must have.
Domain Assumption NuclearUC-DA-01
NuclearUC -DA-01
Short Name
Deal with public opinion
Domain assumption
Nuclear accidents attract media attention. The situation may become even more complex, in cases where public opinion is not properly informed.
Involved Stakeholders

Representative of the national authority

Supporting Material
Radio, TV, loudspeakers
Domain Assumption NuclearUC -02
NuclearUC -DA-02
Short Name
Service oriented application for all.
Domain assumption
Actors involved are heterogeneous and come with their own information systems. To ensure fast and effective communication, service oriented architecture is provided.
Involved Stakeholders
Domain Assumption NuclearUC -03
NuclearUC -DA-02
Short Name
Focus on management, operations and support outside the nuclear plant
Domain assumption
The repairing of the nuclear plant, managed by a separate crisis cell, is out of the scope of our study

Domain description

As explained in section 2.3, the domain description part of the adapted S-Cube model will be covered by (i) an ontology to describe concepts of the domain, relations between these concepts and characteristics of these concepts and (ii) a UML use case diagram to describe the actors and the relations between actors.


Many definitions of an ontology have been given over past years (Gruber 1995, D8.1 InterOp 2004, Grimm et al. 2007): an ontology defines the basic terms and relations comprising the vocabulary of a topic area as well as the rules for combining terms, and relations to define extensions to the vocabulary (Neches et al. 1991). From this definition, an ontology includes not only the terms that are explicitly defined in it, but also the knowledge that can be inferred from it. More simply an ontology may be seen as a formal explicit specification of a shared conceptualisation for a domain of interest. This vision of ontology encompasses several interesting aspects which are:

A formal aspect: an ontology is expressed in a knowledge representation language that provides formal semantics.

An explicit aspect: the type of concepts used and the constraints on their use are explicitly defined.

A sharing aspect: This means there is some kind of agreement among people in a community or systems regarding the ontology.

A conceptualisation aspect: an ontology specifies knowledge in a conceptual way in terms of symbols representing concepts and their relations.

A domain specificity: the specifications in an ontology are limited to knowledge about a particular domain of interest. Ontology is referred to as a representation of knowledge that can be used and reused in order to facilitate the comprehension of concepts and relations as well as the communication between different domain actors.

In the PLAY project, this ontology was needed to represent, in a flexible and computable manner, the knowledge linked to domain and concepts of the use case (cf. S-Cube framework)

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig09 Ontology.jpg
Figure 9: Ontology, number of individuals per classes and macro level view

This ontology in Figure 9 and Figure 10 is composed of three main parts: studied system, crisis characterization, and treatment system.

The studied system is defined as the sub-part of the world affected by the crisis. The Studied system components have been grouped in different categories that should be considered as the basic concepts of a domain specific language, such as goods, natural sites, people and civil society. Goods can be seen as man-made entities (roads, bridges, buildings, houses ...). Opposite to Natural sites, which are not man-made, such as rivers, forests... People concern all the groups of persons that may be impacted by the crisis (people from a city, group of travelers, employees of a company, ...). Civil society includes social entities like media, intellectuals, associations and organizations that act in the crisis area.

The studied system also includes Risks and Dangers. A danger is a particularity of the considered sub-part of the world that might engender some particular risk. For example, an area like Japan presents a characteristic of seismic instability (danger) responsible for earthquake (risk).

Once appeared, a Crisis is composed of four main components: (i) facts, (ii) events, (iii) Complexity factor(s) and (iv) Gravity factor(s).

Facts are what happen in the field. A complexity factor is a characteristic that impacts directly the nature of the crisis and can affect its type (for example, a sanitary crisis may evolve into a social crisis due to the "over-communication" through the media). A gravity factor is a characteristic that impacts directly the gravity of the crisis (for example, a strong wind could increase the gravity of a fire in a forest whereas rain could decrease it).

Events are of four natures:

  • Events "situation" refer to measurements taken from the field (radiations, wind velocity and direction, rain), at a given place and time.
  • Events "Resources" refer to the status of resources, i.e. their availability (time and space) and their relevance (skill, quantity)
  • Events "Activity" refer to the status of activities (not applicable, waiting, work in progress, closed)
  • Events "Consequence" is the noticeable concretization of one or several risks on the crisis studied. It may be the concretization of contamination risks if population is contaminated, or it may also be linked to transportation risks is an accident or a traffic jam occurs. Socio-psychological and fire/explosions consequences are also taken into account.

In order to solve (or to reduce) the crisis, a treatment system is defined with the aim to drive the crisis response in order to stabilize the studied system.

The treatment system is composed of Services, using Resources (human or material). Services are used to reduce a consequence, to prevent the concretization of risks or to lead the system to a specific state, defined by a condition, needed by another service. However a service can be forbidden by risks, consequences, other services or components of the studied system. For example, a risk of building collapse forbids the service of sending firemen inside.

There are two kinds of services: (i) Service of actor and (ii) Service of mediation. Service of actor is service provided by actor. Service of mediation can be a coordination service (between two services of actor) or an added value service such as a weather information service or an Orchestrator, which executing of the collaborative process.

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig10 Ontology.jpg
Figure 10: Ontology

Use Case Diagram / Class Diagram

Figure 11 shows the general use case diagram for the Nuclear Crisis use case. Events are sent to and received from the PLAY system (represented by the upper actor on the diagram). Decisional actors, in the crisis cell, monitor and manage workflows, create new workflows or modify existing ones when needed. They also define priorities. Operational actors execute the requested activities and send back situations reports and diagnosis. Support and consultation actors send diagnosis and measurements.

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig11 UseCaseDiagram.jpg
Figure 11: UML Use Case Diagram

Scenario description

As explained in section 2.2, to resolve the nuclear crisis, we identified seven business processes, which we divided into three levels (see Figure 12):

  1. Decisional
  2. Operational
  3. Support.
PLAY CrisisManagement Fig12 Workflow.jpg
Figure 12: Nuclear Crisis Management

Business processes

As explained in section 2.3.4 (Domain Assumption NuclearUC-DA-03), from the seven business processes identified during the AsIs analysis, we kept only five for the ToBe analysis (see Figure 13, Figure 14 and Figure 15):

1.2 To plan and control relief process and means (decisional)

2.2 To protect population (Operational)

2.3 To provide aid to employees and population (Operational)

3.2 To back relief operations (Support)

3.3 To assess situation (Support)

Indeed, decisions and operations within the plant, to fix the problem, are not managed by the same authority than the rest of the crisis. They also depend on the nuclear plant itself, and the technology it uses. Furthermore, those operations are really technical, not always available, and does not affect the rest of operations (radioactive measurements and previsions are sufficient).

Those business processes are described in detail in the following section.

Out of scope (see Domain Assumptions NuclearUC -DA-03)
PLAY CrisisManagement Fig13 Workflow.jpg
Figure 13: Decisional Workflow

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig14 Workflow.jpg
Figure 14: Operational Workflow

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig15 Workflow.jpg
Figure 15: Support Workflow


From those five business process, we have detailed 16 sub-processes (see Figures 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20).

Each of these business processes is detailed according to S-Cube methodology in the following tables.

Table S1: Scenario NuclearUC_S1_decision1.2
Field Description
UniqueID NuclearUC_S1_decision1.2
Short name To plan and control relief process and means
Involved Actors Prefect (crisis cell)

IRSN (scientific experts)

Detailed Operational Description
  • Activate crisis cell
    • Alert field actors and create a crisis cell composed of delegates of each actor, and managed by the prefect
  • Define and adapt safety perimeter
    • Decide which area is or may be contaminated and ask actors to make sure that no one enters this zone
  • Define preventive actions
    • Create new or modify existing workflows and define priorities (Define the circulation plan and decide to implement it. Ask for measures, ask for advice, analyse the situation. Decide if population should ingest iodine, stay confined or evacuate)
  • Define curative actions
    • Plan, control and coordinate the assistance of victims
  • Manage communication and media
    • Choose and communicate relevant information to media

Additional Material Figure 16 (overview)

Figure 21 (BPMN)

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig16 Workflow.jpg
Figure 16: To plan and control relief process and means (decisional level)

Table S2: Scenario NuclearUC_S2_operation2.2
Field Description
UniqueID NuclearUC_S2_operation2.2
Short name To protect population
Involved Actors Firemen



Office of infrastructure


Detailed Operational Description
  • Alert population
    • Use media and loudspeakers to diffuse information
  • Position and maintain safety perimeter
    • Make sure that the access to the contaminated area is restricted
  • Provide preventive devices and action
    • Distribute iodine capsules, implement circulation plan
  • Evacuate population
    • Ask population to evacuate with their light vehicle or to go to evacuation plan to be evacuated by buses.
Additional Material Figure 17 (overview)

Figure 22 (BPMN)

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig17 Workflow.jpg
Figure 17: Protect population (operational level)

Table S3: Scenario NuclearUC_S4_operation2.4
Field Description
UniqueID NuclearUC_S4_operation2.4
Short name To provide aid to population
Involved Actors Firemen



Detailed Operational Description
  • Provide aid to persons:
    • Decontaminate affected population, assist victims and transfer them to hospital for additional treatment when needed.
  • Treat dangerous situations:
    • Support population psychologically
Additional Material Figure 18 (overview)

Figure 23 (BPMN)

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig18 Workflow.jpg
Figure 18: Provide aid to employees and population (operational level)

Table S4: Scenario NuclearUC_S4_support3.2
Field Description
UniqueID NuclearUC_S4_support3.2
Short name To back relief operations
Involved Actors Prefect

Office of infrastructures

Logistics section of Firemen

Logistics section of Police

Detailed Operational Description
  • Find relevant and available resources
  • Provide relevant and available resources:
    • Find relevant and available resources (material and/or human) needed for operations.
Additional Material Figure 19 (overview)

Figure 24 (BPMN)

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig19 Workflow.jpg
Figure 19: Back relief operation (support level)

Table S5: Scenario NuclearUC_S5_support3.2
Field Description
UniqueID NuclearUC_S5_support3.2
Short name To assess situation
Involved Actors Meteo France

Radiation survey network

Detailed Operational Description
  • Provide radioactivity measures
  • Provide weather characteristics
  • Provide situational reports
    • Relevant measures are sent to crisis cell (wind force and direction, current and expected precipitations, radioactivity level of air, gas, dust, water, animals, plants, aliments, and ground.)
Additional Material Figure 20 (overview)

Figure 25 (BPMN)

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig20 Workflow.jpg
Figure 20: Assess situation (support level)


The final level of S-Cube scenario description concerns the processes definition. In our case of nuclear crisis management, the scenario is very complex and a lot of sub-processes are involved. As far as we planned to simulate this use case through a demonstration platform able to run (in a SOA context) the three levels of processes (strategic, operational and support), we definitely need to describe these processes and its sub-processes in a very detailed manner.

The demonstration platform that will be provided, it will be based on SOA principles and on the ESB PETALS. Such a technical infrastructure requires describing processes as workflows in a runnable language (for instance BPEL). In order to make that task easier and to ensure coherence into the whole approach, all the sub-processes will be described with BPMN language (Business Process Modeling Notation). Furthermore, this language is not only strongly aligned with computer implementation of workflows but also structurally event-oriented (events are represented through circles and can be typed). BPMN is so perfectly at the intersection between PLAY projects specificities (event-based) and technical requirements of the demonstration platform to be provided (proximity between BPMN and workflow language).

Then, the following figures present different swim lanes (horizontal containers) representing the involved actors and the "clouds". Each pool embeds its own activities and flows, while exchanges between pools are represented through flows generating events. We assume that BPMN is finally the ultimate way to represent detailed processes of our nuclear crisis use-case, through a PLAY point of view (event-oriented) and in a manner perfectly adapted for our perspective of ESB-based demonstration platform.

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig21 BPMN.jpg
Figure 21: To plan and control relief processes and means

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig22 BPMN.jpg
Figure 22: To protect population

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig23 BPMN.jpg
Figure 23: Provide aid to employees and population

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig24 BPMN.jpg
Figure 24: To assess situation

PLAY CrisisManagement Fig25 BPMN.jpg
Figure 25: To back relief operations